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ABSTRACT
IZA Policy Paper No. 176 APRIL 2021
Labour Market Policy if the General Public 
Was in Charge
This study uses survey data among both a random sample (N = 500) and a convenience 
sample (N = 2,919) of Flemish adults to assess public support for 24 potential labour market 
reforms. The results show that there is a lot of public support for (both encouraged and 
mandatory) training and community service for the unemployed and for the so-called ‘job 
bonus’, which are all reforms planned by the Flemish government Jambon I. However, 
there is little public support for reforms which should make the – apparently strongly 
desired – increase of the minimum pension to 1,500 euro after taxes possible, such as 
gradually eliminating early retirement possibilities, decreasing how much equated periods 
(such as periods of sick leave and unemployment) count towards pension accrual, and 
(partly) unlinking wages from seniority. This indicates that the end-of-career-debate that 
the Belgian federal government De Croo I wants to have will not be an easy one. For the 
planned increased monitoring to fight social and fiscal fraud, there is, however, a lot of 
public support. Somewhat surprisingly, there is little public support for reforms which aim 
to strengthen the position of women on the labour market, such as more quota for women 
in boards of directors in private companies, more parental leave for couples who divide this 
leave more equally, and increased paternity leave from 10 to 20 days.
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There are many potential labour market reforms which will be discussed by the Flemish government 
Jambon I and the Belgian federal government De Croo I. It is not an easy task for (these) policy makers 
to prioritise different labour market reforms and incorporate them into a clear and consistent strategic 
framework. Indeed, many factors play a role in this prioritisation exercise, such as (but not limited to) 
(i) financial feasibility, (ii) practical feasibility to implement the reforms in a reasonable amount of time, 
(iii) possibility to agree on a set of reforms with different parties and therefore with different ideologies, 
(iv) current and predicted state of the labour market, and (v) support among the general public (Bryson 
& George, 2020). Additionally, policy makers should watch out for a so-called too-much-of-a-good-
thing-effect, in which too many  although positive  initiatives are implemented haphazardly and 
therefore ultimately lead to negative societal outcomes (Pierce & Aguinis, 2013). Policy makers should 
therefore  in discussion with societal partners  reflect on which labour market reforms are (i) feasible, 
(ii) fit in a long-term view of the labour market, and (iii) offer sufficient flexibility to anticipate diverse 
future scenarios with respect to socio-economic development (Bryson & George, 2020). 
This study provides policy makers with clear statistics and insights into one of the abovementioned 
factors in prioritising labour market reforms, namely the public support for these reforms. More 
specifically, we assess in this study the public support for 24 potential labour market reforms among 
those who would experience the consequences of those reforms: the adult Flemish population. 
This study is structured as follows: in Section 2 we discuss the methodological approach of this study; 
in Section 3 we present the results and discuss the most remarkable findings; in Section 4 we conclude 
and formulate suggestions for future research. 
2 Method 
The statistics in this study are based on survey data from a random sample of 500 Flemish adults 
collected between January 28th and February 1st 2021  ga he ed b  e ea ch b ea  Bile di  T  e e 
that the random sample is representative for the broader population, the sample was a priori composed 
by means of a proportional stratification and was a posteriori weighed based on official statistics from 
the Ce m f  I f ma i  ab  he Media  (literal translati  f m Ce m  I f ma ie e  
Media ) and Statbel. The margin of error  which indicates to which extent the results of the sample can 
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deviate from those of the broader population  is 4.4%. The findings were compared to survey data 
from a convenience sample of 2,919 Flemish adults collected between January 19th and February 1st 
2021, gathered through a broad distribution of the survey through Flemish media channels. The findings 
from this convenience sample were not substantially different compared to those of the random 
sample. 
In the survey the respondents indicated on a scale of 0 to 10 to what extent they were in favour of 
24 potential labour market reforms  I  a  i dica ed ha   e e e ed c m le el  agai   
e e e ed a e al i i , a d  e e e ed c m le el  i  fa  A e de  i  c ide ed 
to be in favour of a labour market reform if the reform obtained at least a score of 6 out of 10. The 24 
potential labour market reforms were based on (i) pending labour market reforms in the coalition 
agreement of the Flemish government Jambon I, (ii) pending labour market reforms in the coalition 
agreement of the Belgian federal government De Croo I, and (iii) the expertise of the authors. 
Additionally, the findings were compared between different subgroups. More specifically, the 
following comparisons were made: 
 W me  versus men  
 Olde  versus younger respondents  
 Highe  ed ca i  deg ee versus no higher education degree  
 Si gle versus in a relationship  
 Li i g i  a illage versus living on the countryside  
 Li i g i  he b b  versus living on the countryside  
 Li i g i  a ci  versus living on the countryside  
 Em l ed versus unemployed or inactive 
The comparisons between these subgroups discussed below are based on linear regression analyses 
with standard errors corrected for heteroskedasticity. To measure the differences between these 
subgroups categorical variables were added to the regressions, except for the differences between 
older and younger respondents, for which a linear variable was added. Ordered logistic regressions led 
to similar findings. The significance level was set at 5%. Regression models in which there are additional 
controls for contract type, sector, and experience with the employer or in the function led to 
comparable findings. Some differences between subgroups were not found in the convenience sample. 
This is mentioned in the online appendices to this study. 
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3 Results 
The statistics in Table 1 show what percentage of the respondents in the random sample (N = 500) are 
in favour of the 24 potential labour market reforms. 
< TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE > 
In the following six subsections we discuss the most remarkable results, in which we group 18 of the 
24 potential labour market reforms in six clusters. 
3.1 Social and fiscal fraud 
The most public support in our random sample is found for intensifying the fight against social fraud, 
i.e. increasing monitoring to prevent illegitimately obtained social benefits (86.6% is in favour). Related, 
intensifying the fight against fiscal fraud, i.e. increasing monitoring to prevent moonlighting (undeclared 
work) is ranked as the fourth labour market reform with the most public support (75.0% is in favour). 
We propose three potential explanations for the finding that the public support among the adult 
Flemish population is larger for intensifying the fight against social fraud in comparison to intensifying 
the fight against fiscal fraud. First, fiscal fraud  both as an undeclared worker and as a person employing 
an undeclared worker  is more ubiquitous in Flanders compared to social fraud. As a result, a potential 
not-in-my-backyard-effect is at play, in which people are in favour of reforms that do not have an impact 
on them but are against reforms from which they could experience negative consequences (McAvoy, 
1999). 
Second, when conducting fiscal fraud, it is mainly the state that is disadvantaged as it misses out on 
taxes, while when conducting social fraud, it is mainly the working tax payers who are disadvantaged, 
as they will in the end have to pay for the illegitimately obtained benefits. Given that many of our 
respondents identify more with the latter group of working tax payers, they are more in favour of 
intensifying the fight against social fraud  a reform which has as goal that the working tax payers are 
less disadvantaged  compared to intensifying the fight against fiscal fraud  a reform which has as goal 
that the state is less disadvantaged (McAvoy, 1999). 
Third, the perception of someone conducting fiscal fraud may be different from the perception of 
someone conducting social fraud. While the person conducting fiscal fraud is still working and therefore 
 albeit undeclared  contributing to the labour process, the person conducting social fraud is not 
working and may be more often perceived as someone who is taking advantage of the system. 
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Additionally, results from the survey show that respondents who live in the suburbs or in the city 
(compared to respondents who live on the countryside) are less in favour of intensified monitoring to 
prevent social fraud while older respondents (compared to younger respondents) are more in favour of 
intensified fights against both social and fiscal fraud. This is a remarkable finding throughout the results 
of the survey: respondents who live in the city are less in favour of strict reforms and support more left 
wing opinions while older respondent are more in favour of strict reforms and support more right wing 
opinions. 
3.2 Training and community service for the unemployed 
The second most public support among the 24 proposed labour market reforms exists for the 
encouragement of training for the temporary unemployed (84.8% is in favour). 73.6% of respondents 
are even in favour of making this training mandatory, although policy is at the moment not even close 
to implementing such mandatory training. A possible explanation for these findings are similar to the 
abovementioned proposed explanations for the substantial public support for social fraud: temporary 
unemployment benefits are in the end paid by the working tax payers. Respondents who identify with 
these working tax payers are therefore in favour of reforms which have as goal to guide the temporary 
unemployed towards a job. That way, tax money can again go to public investments from which these 
working tax payers can benefit themselves instead of to temporary unemployment benefits. 
The substantial public support for these labour market reforms is good news for policy makers, given 
the high need for the (re)training of the (temporary) unemployed and inactive to fill bottleneck 
vacancies on the labour market (Debackere et al., 2020; VDAB, 2021). That way, also the gap with 
Scandinavian countries with respect to (re)training of the labour market reserve can be closed (Madsen, 
2005; Bjørsted, Bova, & Dahl, 2016). However, we believe that policy makers should be cautious when 
making training for the temporary unemployed mandatory, as this may come across as too controlling 
and therefore as demotivating. Better would be to find a way to intrinsically motivate the labour market 
reserve to (re)train themselves. This may necessitate to revalue certain jobs (and sectors) which may 
have as a result that also the training for those jobs (and for those sectors) would become more 
attractive. Additionally, policy makers should look for ways through which they can increase labour 
mobility within and between sectors, so that employers do not feel restrained to (re)train people out of 
fear of quickly losing these (re)trained people to another employer who would then reap the benefits 
of their investments. If labour mobility could be increased within and between sectors, this could reduce 
restraints for employers to (re)train people (Verhaest et al., 2018). 
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Related to the public support for training for the temporary unemployed, the third most public 
support exists for the reform that the long-term unemployed should be deployed in community service 
(78.8% is in favour). This reform was included in the coalition agreement of the Flemish government 
Jambon I. A possible explanation for the large public support among the adult Flemish population for 
this reform is similar to abovementioned explanations with respect to (encouraged and mandatory) 
training for the temporary unemployed. Given that the benefits for the long-term unemployed are 
eventually paid by the working tax payers, the latter are in favour of reforms which have as goal to guide 
the long-term unemployed to a job. We suggest that the realisation of such community service  if this 
would ultimately be implemented  should ideally be done in agreement with the long-term 
unemployed themselves. That way, these people can engage in community service that they believe is 
valuable and in which they can develop skills that they wish to develop. Additionally, that way 
community service could be e cei ed a  a  ad a age  e  e me  c m a able  h  
l ee i g i  e cei ed a  a  ad a age  e  e me (Bae   V jić   ), instead of as a 
punishment for the long-term unemployed which would then potentially be perceived as a disadvantage 
in later job applications. 
It is again remarkable that the public support for reforms such as (encouraged and mandatory) 
training for the temporary unemployed and community service for the long-term unemployed is 
especially large among the older respondents (compared to younger respondents), while respondent 
who live in the suburbs or in the city (compared to respondents who live on the countryside) are less in 
favour of mandatory training for the temporary unemployed and community service for the long-term 
unemployed. Additionally, respondents who are working are more in favour of community service for 
the long-term unemployed compared to respondents who are unemployed and inactive. Here too, 
potentially a not-in-my-backyard-effect is at play (McAvoy, 1999). 
3.3 Activating the labour reserve 
One of the main goals of the Flemish government Jambon I at the start of its legislature in 2019 was 
increasing the employment rate to 80%. As at that time Flanders had a very low unemployment rate but 
a substantial amount of inactive people, in the coalition agreement the focus was on tempting the 
inactive people towards the labour market (Baert, 2021). One action to do so was the introduction of 
the so-called j b b  The j b b  had  make e ha  he em l me  a  a d he 
inactivity trap were reduced, i.e. that those who work would financially be better off compared to those 
who do not work. Our results show that for this activation reform public support is large: 74.8% of all 
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respondents are in favour of this reform, ranking it the fifth most supported reform in our study. It is 
remarkable that both working respondents and non-working respondents are equally in favour of this 
labour market reform, indicating a very broad public support for this activation measure. Additionally, 
older respondents are more in favour of this reform compared to younger respondents. 
There is remarkably less public support for the activation measure to make unemployment benefits 
more degressive, i.e. by making them start at a higher level and then let them decreases faster 
compared to now (Baert, 2019). (Only) 57.6% of all respondents are in favour. Despite this limited public 
support among the Flemish population for this reform, the Belgian central bank ( Nationale Bank van 
België ) is in favour of this reform and wants the Belgian federal government De Croo I to reconsider the 
implementation of this reform after the COVID-19 crisis (NBB, 2020), but is apparently not broadly 
supported in this stance by the adult Flemish population. Again older respondents  j  a  i h he j b 
b   are more in favour of this activation measure compared to younger respondents. Also working 
respondents are more in favour of this potential labour market reform compared to unemployed or 
inactive respondents. A possible explanation for this latter finding is that the working tax payers  similar 
to the findings on community service for the long-term unemployed (supra)  are more in favour of 
reforms that have as goal to encourage people who receive unemployment benefits to find a job. 
3.4 End-of-career-debate 
72.2% of all respondents in our random sample are in favour of a minimum pension of 1,500 euro after 
taxes, which is also an ambition of the Belgian federal government De Croo I  although it is still 
somewhat unclear whether this ambition of the government is 1,500 euro before or after taxes. In order 
to make this labour market reform affordable, experts argue that the career length in Belgium needs to 
be increased. Especially given the fact that at this moment Belgian careers are among the shortest in 
Europe (Eurostat, 2020). Therefore, it is surprising that there is only little public support for reforms 
which are necessary to increase the career length and which could therefore help to make the ambition 
of a minimum pension of 1,500 euro after taxes affordable. Indeed, the two reforms which have as goal 
to increase career length are among the five reforms for which there is the least public support among 
the adult Flemish population. 
First, there is the reform to gradually eliminate early retirement possibilities (41.0% is in favour), as 
in Belgium it is still possible to already retire at age 62 (and in some circumstances even at age 58 or 59) 
instead of at the official retirement age of 65. What we believe to be crucial in gradually eliminating 
early retirement possibilities is to ensure workable work  so that careers can be continued also at a 
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higher age. This entails that policy makers should reflect on how people can keep doing their job in a 
healthy and sustainable manner also at a higher age. Also part of this discussion is the potential labour 
market reform of an earlier retirement age for people who work in physically demanding jobs. 71.2% of 
Flemish adults is in favour of this reform. However, in practice it is difficult to construct a list with 
physically demanding jobs as it is difficult to formulate a consistent definition of a physically demanding 
job. Illustrative for this difficulty is that since the intention to construct such a list in 2014, no noteworthy 
progress has been made. 
A second potential labour market reform that could lengthen careers and therefore could make the 
ambition of a minimum pension of 1,500 euro after taxes affordable is decreasing how much equated 
periods  such as periods of sick leave and unemployment  count towards pension accrual. Also for 
this reform there is only limited public support with 41.8% of Flemish adults who are in favour. 
A final measure which may increase chances of employment for people older than 50 is (partly) 
unlinking wages from seniority. The current situation in Belgium is such that the more experienced an 
employee is, the more she/he earns. This can lead to a situation in which two colleagues who are doing 
the exact same job and who only differ in age can earn substantially different wages. This may in turn 
have as a consequence that older job candidates have decreased chances on the labour market because 
of the perception that they are expensive (Van Borm, Burn, & Baert, 2019). However, also for this 
(partly) unlinking of wages from seniority there is little public support (only 35.0% is in favour). Even 
more, it is the labour market reform with the least amount of people in favour of all proposed labour 
market reforms in this study. Both from the perspective of employees as from the perspective of 
employers there are potential explanations for this finding. On the one hand, the link between wages 
and seniority is so commonplace in Flanders that employees may not be in favour of this reform because 
of fear of the unknown. Additionally, older employees may fear that they will be disadvantaged by such 
a reform because their current wage raise due to seniority may disappear. On the other hand, employers 
may not be in favour of this reform as wages based on performance reviews may cause practical 
difficulties and bring about additional hard choices that need to be made by managers with respect to 
wages of personnel. 
Related to making the minimum pension of 1,500 euro after taxes affordable, it is remarkable that 
although the social partners (unions and employer organisations) are mentioned 39 times in the 
coalition agreement of the Belgian federal government De Croo I  among others to facilitate reforms 
to increase the employment rate  there is little public support among Flemish adults to let them co-
coordinate labour market policy (only 39.2% is in favour). A potential reason for this limited trust in the 
social partners may be that earlier reforms that they were put in charge of  such as the 
9 
abovementioned construction of a list with physically demanding jobs and (partly) unlinking wages from 
seniority  were unsuccessful. 
3.5 Work and family 
More than two out of three respondents (67.4%) are in favour of giving priority to the employed in day 
care centres. It is remarkable that the public support for this reform is equally large among the employed 
and the unemployed or inactive. Apparently, also the unemployed and inactive think it is only fair that 
the employed should be given priority in day care centres, making this a reform with very broad public 
support. However, we believe it is important that also the unemployed and inactive maintain sufficient 
access to day care centres in order for them to be able to actively search for a new job and to be able 
to go through the application process. 
Only 44.6% of the respondents are in favour of more parental leave for couples who divide this leave 
more equally and only a slight majority (53.8%) are in favour of increasing paternity leave from 10 to 20 
days  the latter reform was included in the coalition agreement of the Belgian federal government De 
Croo I. This rather low public support is remarkable as research from Norway has shown that more 
paternity leave leads to a more equal division of household tasks and even to better school performance 
by children (Kotsadam & Finseraas, 2011; Cools, Fiva, & Kirkebøen 2015). Additionally, it is remarkable 
that for both reforms women are more in favour compared to men. This finding is in line with findings 
from earlier research on the punishment for motherhood on the labour market. Such punishment 
became clear in research with fake resumes which showed that women are discriminated against 
because they will potentially drop out of the labour market (for a while) because of motherhood (Correll, 
Benard, & Paik, 2007; Capéau, Eeman, Groenez, & Lamberts, 2012; Baert, 2014). 
3.6 Discrimination on the labour market 
Although women are still discriminated against on the labour market  be it as punishment for 
motherhood (supra), be it for other reasons  only 44.8% of Flemish adults are in favour of more quota 
for women in boards of directors in private companies. This despite the fact that in Norway the amount 
of women in boards of directors has doubled to more than 40 percent because of such quota (Wang & 
Kelan, 2013). Additionally, also Spain, France, Italy, and Iceland try to increase the amount of women in 
boards of directors by means of such quota (Axelsdóttir & Einarsdóttir, 2017; de Cabo, Terjesen, Escot, 
& Gimeno, 2019; Comi, Grasseni, Origo, & Pagani, 2020). Additionally, multiple studies have shown that 
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quota may improve  labour market success of women (and of ethnic minority groups) (Ng & Stephenson, 
2015; Seierstad, Healy, Sønju Le Bruyn Goldeng, & Fjellvær, 2021).   
Although quota  be i  f  a ge  mbe   ha d  im ed mbe   may be effective as a 
temporary measure until a certain balance is achieved, they are not necessarily the best solution to fight 
discrimination on the labour market in the long run. Indeed, it is practically impossible to introduce 
quota for every minority group that is discriminated against  see Baert (2018) for an overview  as the 
combination of those quota would create a nearly insolvable puzzle with as consequence hiring 
decisions based on minority traits instead of on capacities of applicants. Some people from minority 
groups may even be against such quota, as they may lead to the perception that they were hired 
because of the quota instead of for their capacities. That is why quota are only one measure of what 
should be a combination of measures to fight labour market discrimination (Derous & Ryan, 2019; 
Seierstad, Healy, Sønju Le Bruyn Goldeng, & Fjellvær, 2021). Additionally, the specific context and need 
for quota should be taken into account, which will differ between hiring decisions for the board of 
directors versus hiring decision for other functions in organisations.  
Consequently, experts point to additional instruments, for example those which may detect (and 
then punish) unequal treatment on the labour market (Baert, Lamberts, & Verhaeghe, 2021). Such 
detection can be achieved by means of field testing, a reform that 51.8% of respondents in our survey 
would be in favour of. Crucial in the potential implementation of such field testing is that it is done in a 
general policy and judicial framework to avoid tests that may be carried out in ways that would not 
always comply with important ethical and scientific principles, which is important given the apparent 
delicacy of field testing. However, field testing is again only one instrument of what should be a larger 
fight against labour market discrimination. Indeed, field testing for instance only looks at the first phase 
of the recruitment and selection procedure. Therefore, simultaneously a broader strategy against 
labour market discrimination should be set up with among others (i) guidance of applicants, (ii) 
sensibilisation of recruiters/HR-professional/employers, and (iii) detection of labour market 
discrimination also during later phases of the recruitment and selection procedure (Derous & Ryan, 
2019) and during later stages of the career (King, 2008).   
4 Conclusion 
In this study we examined by means of a survey the public support among Flemish adults for 24 potential 
labour market reforms. This study provides insights for policy makers into one of the factors in 
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prioritising labour market reforms. The results show that there is a lot of public support for reforms that 
are planned by the Flemish government Jambon I: (both encouraged and mandatory) training for the 
temporary unemployed, community service for the long-term unemployed, and the so-called j b 
b  Al h gh he e i  a l  f blic  f  he ambi i  f he Belgia  federal government De 
Croo I to increase the minimum pension to 1,500 euro after taxes, there is little public support for labour 
market reforms that should make this ambition possible, such as gradually eliminating early retirement 
possibilities, decreasing how much equated periods count towards pension accrual, and (partly) 
unlinking wages from seniority. There is, however, a lot of public support for the fight against fiscal and 
social fraud. Potentially, what is at play here is that respondents are in favour of reforms from which 
they will benefit and are against reforms from which they will experience negative consequences. This 
also becomes clear when assessing the public support for reforms that could strengthen the position of 
women on the labour market, for which the  in general little  public support is consistently higher 
among women.  
Although this study provides insights into the public support for individual labour market reforms, it 
provides no insights into the public support for combinations of labour market reforms. Policy makers 
should be aware of this when taking into account insights from this study when deciding on the optimal 
combination of labour market reforms. Future research should build on this study by setting up discrete 
choice experiments which allow to assess public support for combinations of labour market reforms 
(see for example Gallego and Marx (2017)). 
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Table 1. Public support among Flemish adults for 24 potential labour market reforms. 
n° Potential labour market reform % in favour 
1 Increased monitoring to prevent illegitimately obtained social benefits 86,6% 
2 Encouraged training for the temporary unemployed 84,8% 
3 Community service for the long-term unemployed 78,8% 
4 Increased monitoring to prevent moonlighting (undeclared work) 75,0% 
5 Job bonus: those who work for a low wage keep more of it after taxes 74,8% 
6 Mandatory training for the temporary unemployed 73,6% 
7 Minimum pension of 1,500 euro after taxes 72,2% 
8 Earlier retirement for those who work in physically demanding jobs 71,2% 
9 Priority for the employed in day care centres 67,4% 
10 More degressive unemployment benefits: higher starting level but faster decrease compared to now 57,6% 
11 Limiting employment based on day and week contracts 57,0% 
12 Increased paternity leave from 10 to 20 days 53,8% 
13 Reduction of working hours while maintaining wages 52,8% 
14 Field testing on the sector level to measure labour market discrimination 51,8% 
15 Subsidies for companies who allow telework also after the COVID-19 crisis 51,2% 
16 Subsidies for companies who allow flexible working schemes 49,4% 
17 Let social benefits depend on wage, rather than on statute (such as the statute of unemployment) 46,8% 
18 More quota for women in boards of directors in private companies 44,8% 
19 More parental leave for couples who divide this leave more equally 44,6% 
20 Decrease how much equated periods (such as periods of unemployment) count towards pension accrual 41,8% 
21 Gradually eliminating early retirement possibilities 41,0% 
22 Let social partners (unions and employer organisations) co-coordinate labour market policy 39,2% 
23 Discourage classic performance and evaluation reviews 37,4% 





7 Online appendix: statistics for each potential labour market reform 
7.1 Increased monitoring to prevent illegitimately obtained social benefits 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 3,2% 
Neutral 10,2% 
In favour 86,6% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) Less respondents in favour 










INCREASED MONITORING TO PREVENT ILLEGITIMATELY 
OBTAINED SOCIAL BENEFITS
16 
7.2 Encouraged training for the temporary unemployed 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 2,8% 
Neutral 12,4% 
In favour 84,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











ENCOURAGED TRAINING FOR THE TEMPORARY 
UNEMPLOYED
17 
7.3 Community service for the long-term unemployed  
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 8,2% 
Neutral 13,0% 
In favour 78,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) Less respondents in favour 
Employed (compared to unemployed or inactive) 












COMMUNITY SERVICE FOR THE LONG-TERM 
UNEMPLOYED
18 
7.4 Increased monitoring to prevent moonlighting (undeclared work) 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 7,2% 
Neutral 17,8% 
In favour 75,0% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











INCREASED MONITORING TO PREVENT MOONLIGHTING 
(UNDECLARED WORK)
19 
7.5 Job bonus: those who work for a low wage keep more of it after taxes 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 5,8% 
Neutral 19,4% 
In favour 74,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











JOB BONUS: THOSE WHO WORK FOR A LOW WAGE KEEP 
MORE OF IT AFTER TAXES
20 
7.6 Mandatory training for the temporary unemployed 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 9,2% 
Neutral 17,2% 
In favour 73,6% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) Less respondents in favour 











MANDATORY TRAINING FOR THE TEMPORARY 
UNEMPLOYED
21 
7.7 Minimum pension of 1,500 euro after taxes 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 11,2% 
Neutral 16,6% 
In favour 72,2% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) Less respondents in favour 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











MINIMUM PENSION OF 1,500 EURO AFTER TAXES
22 
7.8 Earlier retirement for those who work in physically demanding jobs 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 13,4% 
Neutral 15,4% 
In favour 71,2% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) Less respondents in favour 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











EARLIER RETIREMENT FOR THOSE WHO WORK IN 
PHYSICALLY DEMANDING JOBS
23 
7.9 Priority for the employed in day care centres 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 9,2% 
Neutral 23,4% 
In favour 67,4% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











PRIORITY FOR THE EMPLOYED IN DAY CARE CENTRES
24 
7.10 More degressive unemployment benefits: higher starting level but faster decrease 
compared to now 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 15,2% 
Neutral 27,2% 
In favour 57,6% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











MORE DEGRESSIVE UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFITS: HIGHER 
STARTING LEVEL BUT FASTER DECREASE COMPARED TO 
NOW
25 
7.11 Limiting employment based on day and week contracts 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 11,0% 
Neutral 32,0% 
In favour 57,0% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) 
More respondents in favour (not significant in 
convenience sample) 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











LIMITING EMPLOYMENT BASED ON DAY AND WEEK 
CONTRACTS
26 
7.12 Increased paternity leave from 10 to 20 days 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 20,8% 
Neutral 25,4% 
In favour 53,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) Less respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











INCREASED PATERNITY LEAVE FROM 10 TO 20 DAYS
27 
7.13 Reduction of working hours while maintaining wages 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 25,4% 
Neutral 21,8% 
In favour 52,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) Less respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) Less respondents in favour 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











REDUCTION OF WORKING HOURS WHILE MAINTAINING 
WAGES
28 
7.14 Field testing on the sector level to measure labour market discrimination 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 16,6% 
Neutral 31,6% 
In favour 51,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) Less respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) 
More respondents in favour (not significant in 
convenience sample) 











FIELD TESTING ON THE SECTOR LEVEL TO MEASURE 
LABOUR MARKET DISCRIMINATION
29 
7.15 Subsidies for companies who allow telework also after the COVID-19 crisis 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 21,8% 
Neutral 27,0% 
In favour 51,2% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) More respondents in favour 











SUBSIDIES FOR COMPANIES WHO ALLOW TELEWORK 
ALSO AFTER THE COVID-19 CRISIS
30 
7.16 Subsidies for companies who allow flexible working schemes 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 18,6% 
Neutral 32,0% 
In favour 49,4% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) 
More respondents in favour (not significant in 
convenience sample) 











SUBSIDIES FOR COMPANIES WHO ALLOW FLEXIBLE 
WORKING SCHEMES
31 
7.17 Let social benefits depend on wage, rather than on statute (such as the statute of 
unemployment) 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 13,2% 
Neutral 40,0% 
In favour 46,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Employed (compared to unemployed or inactive) No significant difference 
 100,0% 











LET SOCIAL BENEFITS DEPEND ON WAGE, RATHER THAN 
ON STATUTE (SUCH AS THE STATUTE OF 
UNEMPLOYMENT) 
32 
7.18 More quota for women in boards of directors in private companies 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 23,4% 
Neutral 31,8% 
In favour 44,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) Less respondents in favour 
Single (compared to in a relationship) 
Less respondents in favour (not significant in 
convenience sample) 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











MORE QUOTA FOR WOMEN IN BOARDS OF DIRECTORS IN 
PRIVATE COMPANIES
33 
7.19 More parental leave for couples who divide this leave more equally 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 18,0% 
Neutral 37,4% 
In favour 44,6% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) Less respondents in favour 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











MORE PARENTAL LEAVE FOR COUPLES WHO DIVIDE THIS 
LEAVE MORE EQUALLY
34 
7.20 Decrease how much equated periods (such as periods of unemployment) count towards 
pension accrual 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 29,2% 
Neutral 29,0% 
In favour 41,8% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











DECREASE HOW MUCH EQUATED PERIODS (SUCH AS 
PERIODS OF UNEMPLOYMENT) COUNT TOWARDS 
PENSION ACCRUAL
35 
7.21 Gradually eliminating early retirement possibilities 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 30,0% 
Neutral 29,0% 
In favour 41,0% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) Less respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) More respondents in favour 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











GRADUALLY ELIMINATING EARLY RETIREMENT 
POSSIBILITIES
36 
7.22 Let social partners (unions and employer organisations) co-coordinate labour market policy 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 27,6% 
Neutral 33,2% 
In favour 39,2% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) More respondents in favour 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











LET SOCIAL PARTNERS (UNIONS AND EMPLOYER 
ORGANISATIONS) CO-COORDINATE LABOUR MARKET 
POLICY
37 
7.23 Discourage classic performance and evaluation reviews 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 20,8% 
Neutral 41,8% 
In favour 37,4% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) More respondents in favour 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) No significant difference 











DISCOURAGE CLASSIC PERFORMANCE AND EVALUATION 
REVIEWS
38 
7.24 (Partly) unlinking of wages from seniority 
  
1. Public support in general  
Against 37,2% 
Neutral 27,8% 
In favour 35,0% 
 100,0% 
2. Public support by subgroups  
Women (compared to men) No significant difference 
Older (compared to younger) No significant difference 
Higher education degree (compared to no higher education degree) No significant difference 
Single (compared to in a relationship) No significant difference 
Living in a village (compared to on the countryside) No significant difference 
Living in the suburbs (compared to on the countryside) 
More respondents in favour (not significant in 
convenience sample) 
Living in a city (compare to on the countryside) More respondents in favour 










(PARTLY) UNLINKING OF WAGES FROM SENIORITY
